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Banking Changes and the Liquidity Problem
The principal reason banks have a liquidity problem is that the
amount of deposits is subject to constant, and sometimes unpredic-
table, change. Consequently any development that affects the sta-
bility of deposits directly involves the liquidity of banks.
CHARACTER OF BANKING ASSETS AND THE
BEHAVIOR OF DEPOSITS
1£ a bank could be sure that the volume of deposits would not vary.
the maintenance of liquidity would call for nothing more than pro-
viding till money for working purposes. The distribution of matu-
rities of earning assets could be determined solely on the basis of
safety and earnings. Moreover, if deposits, even though not con·
stant in amount, were to change in a piedictable manner, the prob-
lem of liquidity would befar simpler chan at present. The maturi-
ties of bank assets could then be arranged according to foreseeable
needs; the determination of ban~ liquidity would approach the
nature of an exact science and there would be little excuse for
having either too many or too few liquid assets.
At the peak of deposit expansion after the last war, investments
represented less than a third of the earning assets of national banks.
Throughout the second half of the twenties they amounted to about
two-fifths, but by 1934 they had risen to half and by the middle of
1944 to nearly four-fifths. 'Vhere fonnerly the dominating element
in earning assets was loans, it is now investments in the fonn of
governmentsecurities. Inasmuch as the volume of deposits is closelv
linked to the volume of earning assets, any difference in variability
between loans and investments bears directly on the future stability
of bank deposits.
The theory ofcommercial bankingatone time rested, as thename
"commercial" banking implies, on the presumption that banks
would engage chiefly in the discounting of short-term paper for
industry and trade. Assuming that changes in the volume of busi-
14ness activity would lead to corresponding changes in the volume
of such paper, the expansion or contraction of demand deposits
through the discounting or retirement of this paper was expected
to accommodate the supply of circulatingmedium to the volume of
business transactions. Theseexpectations were probably never fully
realized in practice, for one reason because bank loans were not
strictly short-term in character. Nevertheless there was a dearly
recognizable tendency for the total of bank loans, including those of
a noncommercial character, to vary more or less in harmony with
the general course of business activity. This rough similarity is
suggested by Chart 1, showing changes in the volume of bank loans
from 1919 to 1941 plotted against the curve of industrial production.
There has been no corresponding tendency for changes in the
"olume of federal debt outstanding to be related to changes in eco-
nomic activity. The growth of the national debt has been gov-
erned, in the present century at least, primarily by two factors, war
and depression. The federal debt has behaved in a very different
manner from sh<;>rt-term paper or bank loans. The volume of such
debt increased greatly in time of war and business depression, de-
creased during the period of prosperity in the twenties and showed
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15relatively few and small short·run fluctuations. The significance ~(
these differences to the way deposits may be expected to behave IS
indicated by Chart 2. Curve A of this chart shows for the period
1920-41 the actual volume ofadjusted demand deposits of all banks.
Curve .B shows what changes would have occurr«d in the volume of
bank deposits if they had maintained a constant relationship to the
volume of short-term private debt.9 If, on the other hand. deposits
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had maintained a constant relationship to the volume of federal
debt, the trend would have corresponded to that shown in curve C.
A combination of these two bases would have yielded a pattern of
deposits somewhere between curves Band C.
\Vhile the foregoing comparisons are purely hypothetical they
lead to the clear inference that a deposit structure tied primarily to
gm'ernment debt would behave differently from oue tied primarily
to short-term private debt. It would probably show a greater sta-
bility as to amount, and instead of contracting at a time of business
decline it might exhibit the opposite tendency.
9 Assuming for the sake of the argument that the volume of loalls would have been
the same as it was under the conditions that aClIIal1y prevailed_
16As matters stand today, the only way a substantial decline in
deposits could come about would be through a decrease in the
volume ot Treasury obligations held by banks. Such a decrease
would presumably call for a net repayment of debt by the guvern-
ment or a transfer of federal obligations from the banks to other
investors. It is not certain, however, that either of these develop-
ments would necessarily result in a contraction of bank deposits;
the tendency for a decline in bank holdings of government debt to
reduce deposits could be offset by an expansion of private loans and
investments. However, such an expansion might occur even with-
out a decrease in government obligations. In that case the reduc-
tion in government debt held by banks would at least have the effect
of restricting the total of earning assets (and therefore the volume
of deposits) as compared with what they othenvise would have been.
Furthermore, as long as earning assets consist ovenvhelmingly of
government obligations, the volume of deposits is no longer subject
to the same spontaneous tendency toward contraction in a period of
falling business that exists when assets are of a commercial charac-
ter. Since Treasury debt is neither proportional to business activity
nor uniformly of shortduration, a decline in business activity would
not, automatically, reduce the volume of bank assets of this char-
acter. Moreover, changes in public confidence would be less likelv
to contribute to fluctuations in the amount of these assets. Greater
stability of deposits in time of declining business is of considerable
importance; its precise implications are to be judged. however, pri-
marily on the basis of the significance attached to the mlume of
circulating medium as a determinant of prices and production.
Similar considerations apply to the probable effects of business
expansion. \Vhile changes in the volume of circulating medinm in
exact response to the "needs of industry and trade" have never been
entirely automatic, the recent displacement of private debt by
government debt as the principal basis of demand deposits has
rendered the probability of a perfect automatic adjustment still
more remote.tO
10 II is 1101 slIg.l;esleu Ihal Ihe chall~e is ahugelher c(lmplele. III Ihe pasl. im'eslments
fornwd a par: of earning assels; in Ihe present. shorl-Ierm paper has nOI entirely dis·
appeared. The difference is one of degree. hili Ihe degree is so eXlreme Ihal Ihe line
of argumenl is not altered by Ihe facl lhal a rCiliduum of Ihe fonner basis of deposils
still remaills. Nor is il suggesled here Ihal such an automalic adjllStmem of Ihe
circlliating medium wOllld be desirable e,'en if il cOllld be COllnted IIpoll.
17This discussion of the stability of aggregate bank deposits stilI
leaves untouched the problem of the stability of deposits which
confronts the individual banker. For him liquidity and solvencv
are matters not so much of the absolute total as of the distrihutiol"l
of the total. He is likely to be more directly affected by the flow of
funds from one part of the system to another. At one stage of war
financing deposits were being shifted from New York and certain
other centers to banks in defense areas where heavy disbursements
were being made. Ifat some future time disbursements in defense
areas should decrease relative to the payments these areas are calIcd
upon to make outside, a decline in deposits and a drain of resenes
to other parts of the country may be expected to ensue. Banks in
areas being deflated relative to the rest of the country will tend to
lose deposits to banks more favorably situated. It is because of
regional shifts that the possibility stilI remains of a liquidity crisis
for individual banks or for banks in particular areas. The fear of
this contingency helps to explain the reluctance of some bankers to
act freely on the advice of Federal Reserve authorities to invest idle
funds, even when they were given "assurance that hanks wilI be
provided with reserves, by one means or another. if additional
reserves are needed." 11 "
Since· the shifting about of banking funds within the banking
system is determined by internal balances of payments and not by
the type of security on which deposits are hased, allY difference in
deposit behavior resulting from the change in character of security
is likely to be indirect rather than direct. Under conditions that
existed in the early thirties banks suffering as the result of a regional
drain were frequently compelled to accommodate themselves to a
smalIershare of a dwindling total of deposits. Itwould appear that
the total volume of deposits is less likely to decline in a period of
falling business activity, now that they are so largely based npon
government obligations. While this does not preclude the prob-
ability of serious strain for individual banks, the strain may be less
than if the total volume of deposits were declining sharply. And
the pressure on the system as a whole may be greatly lessened. for a
condition of stringency in one area, arising out of a decline of bank
deposits in that area, may have as its counterpart an expansion of
deposits in another part of the system. Under such circumstances.
11 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Circular 2534 (October 30. 1942).
l8the condition of strain would be easier to cope with because it was
less general, and, in addition, banks in certain areas would be in a
position, because of expanded balances, to come to the assistance of
banks in other areas where deposits were declining.
RELATIVE DEPOSIT GROWTH AND PROBABLE
DEPOSIT CONTRACTION
The view is sometimes encountered that the recent increase in bank
deposits, since it is so largely a product of wartime conditions, can
be expected to disappear when the war is over. The question of
the pennanence of the deposit growth is of the utmost importance
in the determination of policies for the acquisition of particular
types and maturities ofbank assets; if the conclusion is correct that
the growth is only temporary, banks must prepare now for meeting
the future contraction of deposits. The following analysis does not
attempt to forecast changes in the volume of bank deposits. It is
merely designed to disclose the basic assumptions inherent in any
general conclusion that deposits, whether of the entire banking
system or of any individual bank, are certain to decrease. In some
instances the assumptions may be ,oalid and in others not; the pur-
pose here is to consider only what the ass!Jmptions are and not to
pass upon their validity.
Since the growth in deposits is so directly attributable to the
acquisition of government obligations, a material reduction in
deposits would require a reversal of the process whereby °they were
created.12 An expectation that the total of deposits in the country
is likely to decline materially must rest on one or both of these
assumptions:
a. That the Treasury will retire a large part of the debt
now held by banks;
b. That government debt will be transferred from the
banks to other holders without resort to private bor-
rowing from banks.
A belief that the increase in an individual bank's deposits is only
12 The initiatiloe for a contraction ofdeposits might conceivably come from a variety
of causes sut:h as a withdrawal of foreign balances, a great increase in t:UlTency or a
panic in the government security market. \Vhatever the cause, an extreme contraction
of deposits would be impossible without an accompanying reduction in holdings of
gO\oemment securities.
19temporary may reflect a conviction, no~ that all dq~sits.will decline,
but that a particular ;}rea or a partlClllar hank IS hkely to lose
deposits to other areas or banks. It is .therefore nefessary to exam-
ine the assumptions implicit in the new that there may he such
reoiona! or local shifts in deposit balauces. But before specifying
th~se assumptions it is necessary to indicate certain general facts
and principles.
Between June 1940 aud June 1944 hauk deposits in reserve city
aud central resene city banks increased hy an anrage of 110 aud
62 percent, respectively. At one extreme were \Vichita aud Seattle
with increases of 226 and 220 percent, respectively, and at the other
extreme Galveston and Pittshmgh with iuueases of 47 and 5~ per-
cent. If it could be assumed that 1940 represeuted the uormal rlis-
tribution of deposits. to which a return could he expected, it wouln
follow that deviations of each citv's positiou from the a'-eraue for . ~
all banks in the coulltry woulrl measure the extent of proh:thle
future losses or gains of deposits. Since it is far from certain either
that conditions were wholly normal iu 1940 or that the relative
10ng-TIln position of each city has remained unaltered siuce then,
no such rigid deductiou as this is permissible. Nnertheless, the
year 1940 was perhaps more nearly "uormal", than 1944. aud
deviations from the relative distribution of deposits prnailiug in
1940 may therefore be a useful, neu though tentati,-e, guide to
prospective liquidity requirements.
In analyzing the prospects of a particular city or bank with regard
to the probable futme movements of deposits, a starting point
might be to determine what its deposits would be if they constitnted
the same share of total deposits as they did in 1940 (or any other
base year regarded as most representative). The figure thus chosen
might be taken as "normal." The practical problem would then be
to attempt to determine the factors, peculiar to the area or the bauk,
that establish a probability that the futme inward or outward move-
ment of funds will be more or less thau that sugO"ested b,· the aver-
~ .
age or normal figure. This would call for a consideration of the
permauence of recent industrial expansion in the territory served,
the 10ng-TIln movement of capital (e.g., to sa,-ings institutions such
as life insurance companies), the type of financial operations carried
on and changes that lllay have taken place either in the foregoing
elements or in the character of the business carried ou by the par-
20ticular institutions (e.g., a shift from predominantly trust business
to a greater dependence on general banking).
It is now possible to indicate the assumptions that seem to he
implicit in the view that the increase in the deposits of any indi-
\'idual bank is only temporary even though lolal depo:sits fur the
country as a whole were to remain the same:
The expectation that the bank's deposits will decline as-
sumes a shift in deposits away from that bank to other
banks in the country.
Expectation of the loss of any deposits (i.e., a belief that
auy part of the increase is temporary) presumes:
(a) That the increase in this bank's deposits has been
greater than the average for the system. or
(h) If no more than the average, that the long-run posi-
tion of the bank has deteriorated so that its present
share of deposits is greater, relative to the share of
deposits held by other banks, than can be expected to
he permanent.
Belief that all of the increase in the bank's deposits since
some base period is temporary implies the assumption that
TABLE I-GROWTH OF MEMBER BANK DEPOSITS BY FEDERAL
RESERVE DISTRICTS, JUNE 1940 TO JUNE 1944
(dollarfigures ill millions)
Total MemberBank Deposits Increase
District
June 1940 June 1944 Amount Percentage
Boston $2,887 $5,409 $2,522 87.4%
New York 19.212 !1,982 12,770 66.5
Philadelphia 3,248 5.256 2.008 61.8
Cleveland !.975 8,027 4,052 101.9
Richmond 2,025 4,435 2,410 119.0
Atlanta 1,786 4,497 2,711 151.8
Chicago 7,M1 15,550 8.209 III.8
St. Louis 1,701 3,542 1,841 108.2
~Iinneapolis 1,I!lO 2,470 IJ40 118.6
Kansas City 1,829 4,285 2,456 134,3
Dallas 1,571 3.866 2,295 146.1
San Francisco 5,024 11,957 6,933 U8.0
ALL MutBEll BANKS $51,729 $101,276 $49,547 95.8%
Source: Federal Reserw Bulletin.
21the long.run position of the bank. has deteriorated relath'e
to other banks in the system. The implied deterioration
is exactly inverse to the difference between the amount of
its deposits in that base period and the "normal" or a\'er-
age level of deposits as defined above.
13
The preceding discussion may be illustrated by a series of com·
parisons. In Table I is shown the average rate of growth of memo
ber bank deposits from June 1940 to June 1944 for all Federal
Reserve Districts and for each District individually. The deposit
expansion in particular districts varied from a high of 151.8 and
146.1 percent in the Atlanta and Dallas Districts, respectively, to a
low of 61.8 and 66.5 percent in the Philadelphia and New York
Districts. The expansion for member banks as a whole was 95.8
percent.
Similar comparisons for reserve city and central reserve city banks
in a selected gronp of cities throughout the country are presented
in Table 2. This list includes the six cities showing the greatest,
and the six cities showing the smallest, relative increase in deposits
over the 4-year period. A slightly different comparison is afforded
by Table 3. The actual growth in dollar volume of deposits from
June 1940 to June 1944 is shown in column I for the group of cities
listed in Table 2. Column 2 shows the growth that would have
occurred if the rate of deposit expansion had been the same (95.8
13 A funhcr implicil assumplion lhal may be involved in an im'eslmem polin'
predicaled upon lhe belief lhal lhe increase in deposils is only lemporary may aim
be nOled. The purchase of Treasury bills. if this is based on tile supposed temporary
character of tile e....pallsioll ill deposits, enlails lhe assumplion lhal lhe decrease in
deposils will occur, nOl jusl sooner or laler. bUl specifically within lhree momhs.
Similarly a purchase of cenificales would im'oh'e lhe assumplion lhal a decrease in
deposils mar occur wilhin olle ~'ear.
.~ was memioned .al lhe sIan: lhe anal~'sis presemed above is solely designed 10
arnve al lhe underlung assllmpllons lhal are unaroidably implicil in lhe Slalemem
~hal .lhe increast; in ~eposils is lemporary. For any inslilUlion lhe \'alidily of lhe
ImplIed assumpllons IS a mailer 10 be decided b)' lile bank's officers. h mUSl be
rernembe~ lhal.lhese general commenlS do ~Ol alford a complele basis for judging
lhe .po~l~oho polIo' of a bank. Even lhough 11 were agreed lhal lhe presem degree
of.IIqUldllr of asselS was nOl warramed br lhe prospeclS of a reduClion in deposils. il
mlghl ne\'enheless be defended on such grounds as lhal:
a. A decrease in. li~ui~ilY would be.illlcrprcled by presenl and prospeclh'e
cuslomers as mdlcallng lhe adopllon of an incaUliolls polin' on llIe pan
of (he managemelll. .
b. Tax~ are so high as 10 absorb mOSl of lhe added earnings lhal would be
oblamed from a lenglhening of malUrilies.
c. Earnings are already sullicienlly generous so lhal lhe pos.~ibilil)'of oblaining
somewhal larger profits does nOl justify lhe sacrifice of IiquidilY.
22percent) as it was for member banks as a whole. These amounts,
added. to deposits in the base year, would yield totals corresponding
to the "normal" figures described above. The differences between
the hypothetical amounts shown in column 2 and the actual increase
in deposits from June 1940 to June 1944 (column 1) are Riven in
TABLE 2-GRowTH OF MEMBER BANK DEPOSITS IN SHEerED RESERVE
AND CENTRAL RESERVE CITIES, JUNE 1940 TO JUNE 1944-
(dollar figures in millions)
Total Member Bank Deposits lncrease
City
June 1940 June 1944 Amount Percentage
(Cities showing greatest increase)
Wichita $61 $199 $138 226.2%
Seattle 339 1.086 747 220.4
Omaha 124 359 235 189.5
Sioux. City 27 78 51 11\8.9
Savannah 116 319 203 ]75.0
Detroit 883 2.378 1,495 169.3
(Cities showing least increa..ce)
Boston $U95 $2,568 $973 69.7%
St. Louis 668 1.081 413 61.8
New York 16.063 25.794 9.731 60.6
Philadelphia 1,668 2,500 922 55.3
Pittsburgh 1.146 1.744 598 52.2
Gah·eston 45 66 21 46.7
ALI. hfEMBER B"'NKS $51,729 $101,276 $49,547 95.8%
Source: Member Bank Call Reports.
_Citiell with less than four resel"\"e cit)· member hanks were nut included in the
comparison.
column 3. The plus and minus quantities in column 3 represent
the amounts by which, with no change in deposits of all member
banks, deposits in the particular cities might have been expected to
fall or rise after the present emergency - or rather after the emer-
gency as it existed in June 1944 - if the distribution of deposits
were to return to what it was in the base year.
The percentages in column 4 show changes in deposits, com-
pared with June 1944, that would occur if total deposits for the
country should remain constant and the relative distribution of
deposits amongbanks should return to thatwhich prevailed in 1940.
23The direction of the percentage change is shown by the plus and
minus signs. It is not intended to suggest that either of the implicit
assumptions is rigidly tenable, i.e., that the total of deposits (:an he
expected to be identical with that of 1944 or the distribution of
deposits identical with that of 1940. The prauical significance ot
columns 3 and 4 depends on the extent to which, first, relative busi-
ness conditions of the base year are regarded as more typical than
those prevailing in 1944 and. secondly, banks as a whole <Ire ex-
pected to retain a volume ofdebt dose to that held in 1944. Subjen
TABLE 3-DEVlATlO:\S OF DEPoSIT GROWTH FRO:\I A\'FR..\(;l~
FOR SYSTEM, SELU.TED R['~ER"I::, CITY AND CL"\TRAL RESER,r
Cny BANKS, jV:-.iE 1940 TOJun 1944




















































(Cilies showing leaSI increase)
$973 $1,!J36 5-363 tI5.3<;1r
413 640 -227 t21.0
9.731 15,!J88 -5.657 t21.9
922 1,598 --676 t26.1
598 1,098 -500 +28.7
21 43 -22 +33.3 ----------- ------------
Source: Based on dala from Member Balik Call Report5.
a Figures in Ihis column reprcselll Ihe amount of deposil growlh Ih:1I \,(llIl,l corre-
spond 10 Ihe hypolhelical "normal" described in Ihe lexl.
to these conditions, it follows that column 4 indicates. at a mIDI-
mum, the relative direction of, and possibly somethino- of the rela-
tive differences in, future changes of deposits. ~
24Deposit growth for any individual bank could be compared on
the same basis with the average for the country as a whole or with
that of any particular group or category of banks. Subject to the
reservations mentioned above, this comparison could then be used
to indicate possible tendencies in the future behavior of its deposits.
RELATION OF PORTFOLIO POLICY
TO DEPOSIT GROWTH
The suggestion that banks which have experienced the greatest
relative growth of deposits may tend to undergo the greatest con·
traction in deposits at some time in the future raises the question
whether any correlation is to be detected between relative differ-
ences in the rate of deposit gTOwth and portfolio policy. Specifi-
cally, have banks showing the greatest relative growth in deposits
tended to hold a greater prop01'tion of their assets in the more
liquid fonns?
An attempt has been made to arrive at an answer to this question
by an analysis of deposit growth and portfolio policy (a) among
different reserve cities and (b) in the various states. A comparison
of the portfolios of banks in the ten cities showing the greatest rela-
tive increase in deposits between June 1940 and June 1943 with the
portfolios of banks in the ten cities which have shown the least
increase yields rather inconclusive results. In Keneral, the portfolio
policies of the two groups appear to be very similar, and such differ-
ences as do exist are mixed in character. \Vhile the propOltion of
total Treasury obligations to total assets is almost identical in the
two cases, on the average the group of banks with the greatest rela-
tive increase in deposits held a larger proportion of these securities
in maturities of one year or less. This would seem to imply some
correspondence between deposit expansion and liquidity of assets.
On the otherhand, this pattern of behavior is by no means uniform;
thus banks in Wichita, the city with the greatest increase in deposits
during the period, held a smaller share of government obligations
in short-term maturities than banks in any other city except one in
either group.
The evidence drawn from figures for all insured banks. classified
by individual states, is likewise inconclusive. The relation between
deposit growth and character of bank assets is shown in Chart 3 for
25all states. The first of these diagrams indicates that the proportion
of assets in the fonn of cash and Treasury obligations was dOliely
concentrated between 70 and 80 percent of total assets. Such devia-
CHART 3-INCREASE IN TOTAL DEPOSITS, JUNE 1939· JUNE 1943.
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26tion as occurred was notappreciably related to differences in deposit
growth. except in the case of Vermont which stands out by itself.
Thesecond diagram is concerned only with the ratio of assets in the
most liquid form, namely, cash and Treasury bills. Again there is
pronounced, though not quite as extreme, concentration, this time
in a range of between40 and 50 percent of total assets. In the lower
range there appears to be a tendency for liquidity of assets to be
correlated with deposit growth. For the entire group,· however,
there is little if any significant correlation.14 The state showing the
highest ratio of cash and bills is well in the lower half of states as
classified by rate of deposit growth. Conversely. the three states
with the largest growth in deposits fall in the lower group as judged
by proportion ofassets in the form of cash and Treasury bills.
The data were also analyzed on the basis of banks in the ten
states showing the greatest, and the ten states showing the smallest,
increase in deposits from 1939 to 1943. As in the case of individual
cities, the proportion of total assets held in the form of Treasury
obligations averaged almost the same for banks in both categories.
The principal divergence is to be detected in connection with hold-
ings of cash. The ten states with the smallest relative increase in
deposits held a considerably lower proportion of total assets in the
form of cash and due from banks. Included in the group with the
smallest relative increase in deposits are several eastern states having
many metropolitan banks whose excess reserves have fallen to a
minimum. In the othergroup are a number of agricultural states.
including a high proportion of country banks which have tended to
retain a considerable amount of excess reserves. Whether differ-
ences in the proportion of cash holdings in the various states reflect
differences in deposit growth or in the types of banks that predomi-
nate is not at all clear. At any rate the evidence fails to support the
view that differences in relative deposit growth among groups of
banks have exerted a major influence upon their portfolio policies.
DEPOSIT CONTRACTION AND SOLVENCY,
A CASE HISTORY
The predominance of government securities in bank portfolios has
simplified one important decision that the individual bank must
8 This principle is recognized m lhe procedure known as ·'mluation aJlowam:es:·
absolute and percentage changes in liquid assets and deposits over the period 1939-43.
27make in case an increase in liquidity demands makes it necessary to
convert earning assets into cash. This is the question of which
assets to liquidate. Under circumstances prevailing- in 1945, the
choice of what to sell in case of a substantial increase in the demand
for cash is pretty well restricted to Treasury obligations.
The possible importance of this change is suggested by the actual
experience of a prominent western bank in the period after the first
'Vorld 'Var. This bank was one of the oldest, strongest and most
conservative banks in the state. It was also one of the largest.
During the war it experienced a comiderable increase in deposits.
Unfortunately for the bank, the most important account. that of a
wartime government corporation, constituted more than a quarter
of the bank's total deposits. After the conclusion of hostilities it
was decided that these funds should he transferred to eastern banks
preparatory to terminating the affairs of the corporation.
The problem this presented to the bank was made the subject of
discussion between the bank's officers and the officials of the war
agency. A plan was worked out through mutual agTeement pro-
viding for the liquidation of the account by withdrawals ofS500.000
semi-annually until the total deposit, amounting to $7,000,000, had
been transferred. Since this meant allowing seven years to settle
an account that had be~n built up in approximately two years, the::
agreement seemed to all parties not only reasonable hut ~enerous.
In tackling the problem of meeting- the stipulated semi-annnal
payments, the administrative heads of the bank decided against
undertaking to convert their most liquid loans. They reasoned that
to follow such a policy would mean driving their most desirable
customers to other banks. \Vhile the immediate problem could
readily have been solved in this way, in the end the fruits of years
of effort would have been lost, making it necessary to start all moer
again to build up a suitable clientele. Steps were accordingly taken
to liquidate loans of the types regarded as least pennanent or least
desirable to retain in the future.
At the time the bank held a good many loans that had to be
renewed, includingcattle loans which were nominally of six months'
duration but were used ror financing breeding operations and there-
fore represented a somewhat longer use of the funds. These loans
had expanded greatly under the pressure of the war but were
not of a type that the bank, which was more of a city institution,
28regarded as adapted to its long-run requirements. The bank worked
out arrangements with one of the agricultural credit institutions to
lake ove1· much of this paper. To do so, it was necessary for the
bank to agree to some scaling down and to accept secondary loans
for the balance. Because of the 1920 collapse in agricultnral prices
it became impossible to thaw out these secondary loans. The same
decline in commodity prices led directly or indirectly to difficnlties
with other loans the bank had outstanding. Eventually the affairs
of the bank reached a point where it could no longer be kept in
operation. The institution was taken over by another bank at
hea,"y loss to the stockholders, and its identity was lost. 'Vhether or
not the subsequent history of the bank would have been happier if
it had made a different decision concerning the procedure of liqui-
dation is perhaps debatable. In any case. the experience illustrates
the dilemma of choosing among different types of assets.
'Vith the present distribution of banking assets in this country,
the situation is very different from what it was after the last war. It
differs, first, in the possibility of choosing among types of assets,
since the volume of nongovernmental obligations is today relatively
so much smaller, and, secondly, in the volume of assets that are sub-
ject to deterioration in value as part of a general decline in com-
modity pricesY; Differences in the maturity of bank holdings of
government securities may call for policy decisions in case of future
liquidation, hut the decision concerning what maturities to liqui-
date is considerably simpler than the choice fonnerly required
among types of obligations and classes of obligors. This aspect of
the liquidity problem has been perceptibly simplified.
The significance of the change that has occurred can readily be
seen by inquiring what might be expected if a bank at the present
time were to find itself confronted by the certain prospect of a
reduction of one-fourth in the total of its deposits. Assuming that
the bank stands somewhere near the average of all banks. it would
hold government obligations equal to approximately three-quarters
of its deposits, a substantial share of them in short maturities. It
could sell government securities equal to the amount of the decline
in deposits without disturbing the bank's relations with any of its
other customers. 'Vith policies that are now in foree. this opera-
15 On the olher hand. it depends 10 a much grealer eXlenl on Ihe market for
Treasury obligalions.
29tion could be carried through without loss to the bank.lo Assuming
a fairly typical distribution of maturities, it could be accomplished
within a fairly short period of time by simply allowing assets to run
off. whether or not the present support of the security market by
the Federal Reserve Banks was maintained. \Vhether the bank
could undergo this degree of shrinkage without jeopardizing its
earnings position is perhaps another question, though even with a
substantial decline in deposits many banks could expect to show
profits as high as characterized the period before the wartime ex-
pansion in deposits. In any case, it is clear that most banks are
equipped, through the type and liquidity of assets they hold, to
meet a contraction of deposits in a way that was not approached
in the pastY
THE RATIO OF CAPITAL TO ASSETS
For some time before the outbreak of the war in 1939 it had come
to be widely accepted that capital accounts (capital, surplus, undi-
vided profits and reserves for contingencies) should be equal to at
least 10 percent of a bank's total assets.IS This ratio served as a
convenient rule-of-thumb for bankers and was endorsed by the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation.I9 In June 1939 total capital
accounts of all banks in the country stood at 11 percent of assets.
Four years later, as a result chiefly of the great expansion in assets
16 This anal~osis relates to the liquidity problem of an individnal bank resulting
from :l transfer of deposits 10 other banks in the system. An allempt by all banks to
liquidate long-tenn securities on a large scale wonld tend 10 defeat iLself because of
market reactions. Howe,oer. the large holdings of short-term securities which could
be allowed to malUre would seem to preclude the necessity of such all allempt. The
question of changes in aggregate deposits is considered abo,oe, pp. 14 If.
17 Furthermore. e\1~n in the absence of excess reserves. the higher ratio of cash to
deposits means that a greater proportion of cash would become available in case of a
permanent contraction in deposiu. E"en decline in the volume of deposits would
release rcsenes pre,oiousl". reqnired to be held against these deposits. Since a higher
rcsene ratio is now reqnired. a correspondingly greater amount of cash would be set
free for e"e~o dollar of decrease in deposits. The principal courses open to a bank
which was subjected to a hea,! drain of deposits would indude the sale of Treasury'
bills and the maturing of short-tern1 asselS. the retluetion in holdings of cash and
balances with correspondents. the sale of longer·term Treasu~' obligations and hor-
lowing from the Resene Banks. While some bankers are strongh opposed 10 borrow-
ing. a certain amount of borrowing has already occurred and in case of necessit)'
borrowing could be expened to become more general.
IS Cf. the detailed historical and anahtical discussion in Roland I. Robinson. "The
Capital.Deposit Ratio in Banking Supenision," jOllmol of Political Economy (Febru·
a~o 1!H1). .
19 See .4",11101 Rt"ports for 1936. 19!1i and 19!19. pp. Zl, 15 and 12. Jespecti\°el}·.












Source: ComplToller of the CurrenC}'. Reports; and Federal Deposil Insurance Cor·
poration, Reports.
following the start of heavy war financing, the ratio for all banks
had fallen to 7 percent.20 While the ratio of capital to assets had
declined almost without interruption from the start of banking in
this country, the decrease fTOm 1939 to 1944 was unprecedented in
both magnitude and abruptness (see Charts 4 and 5).
The most striking feature in connection with the ratio of capital
to assets is not so much that the ratio has changed as that the ratio
20 A majority of banks increa§ed the amount of capital during this period but the
increase was not sufficient 10 keep pace with the growth in assets. In 1943,63.5 percell!
of the net profits of national banks were added to capital accounts (Treasury Depart.
ment, Pra<l Release No. 41·49, April 13. 1944). A few banks sold additional stock.
31varies so greatly among banks in different parts of the country. At
the middle of 1943 the ratio of capital to assets for banks in different
states ranged from a high of 13.5 percent in Vermont to a low of
CHART 5-CAPITAL ACCOUNTS AND TOTAL ASSETS OF
MEMBER BANKS, 19z"1-44
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Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics and Member Bank Call RepoTts, 1942-44.
3.6 percent in Arizona. Differences of this character are not a new
phenomenon. In 1939 as in 1943 the banks of Vermont had the
highest ratio of capital to assets, .though it was then 18.8 percent,
while Arizona, with 7.8 percent, had next to the lowest. In both
periods the highest ratios prevailed, generally speaking, in the
eastern, and especially the New England, states and the lowest ratios
in the western, and especially the far western, states.
The effect of changes in the relationship of capital to assets from
1939 to 1943 was to bring about a somewhat greater uniformity
among banks with respect to the ratios maintained. This may be
seen from Chart 6 showing by states the extent of concentration in
different categories of capital-to-assets ratios. In 1939, the num-
ber was more or less evenly distributed among banks with capital
32ratios ranging from 8 and 9 percent of assets to those with ratios
between 12 and 13 percent. In 1943, there was a marked concen-
tration in the group with capital ratios of from 6 to 7 percent of
assets with a substantial number in each group abO\'e and below,
and relatively few in any othercategory.
It is important to recognize that the recent decline in the capital
ratio hascomeaboutalmostwholly through an expansion in holdings
of Treasury obligations. Theratioofthecapitalofcommercial banks
to so-called "depreciable assets" (total assets les.~ cash and Treasury
obligations), which is sometimes offered as a more significant com-
parison than the ratio of capital to all assets, remained relatively
stabIe in the period from 1933 to 1944. The ratios for all insured
commercial banks of capital to deposits, to total assets and to assets
other than cash and government obligations are given in Table 4.
DUling the period from the end of 1933 to the middle of 1944 the
CHART 6-RATIO OF CAPITAL ACCOUNTS TO TOTAL ASSETS OF
INSURED COMMERCIAL BANKS, BY STATES, 1939 ANI> 1943
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Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation• .4ssets and Liabililie.~ of Operating
Imured BOll/u.
33ratio of capital accounts to total deposits declined by 64 percent.
and the ratio of capital accounts to total assets by 58 percent. The
ratio of capital to "depreciable assets," on the other hand, showed
an increase of 12 percent between 19~~ and 1944.
Thus the falling ratio of capital to total assets in the last ten
years, and more especially in the last three, reflects chietty the rising
volume of assets which are subject to little if any depreciation.
Even though the immediate safety of banks is not in question. there
is still objection to a permanent departure from an accepted ralio.
In the past half century there have heen three periods of sudden
change in the ratio of capital to assets of national banks (Chart 4\.
From 1895 to 1900 the proportion of capital to assets of national
TABLE 4-CAPITAI. RATIOS OF INSURED
COMMERCIAl. BAj\;K~, 1933-44
Total Capital Accoullts per $100of-
End01 Total
Deposits


















































Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Assets arid Liabilities 01 Operating
Insured Banks.
a Includes total assets minus United States govemmmt obligations direct and guar-
anteed and cash and due from banks.
b Data for December 30. 1933 include banks which became imured Janna,")" 1, 1934.
banks fell from 28 percent to 20 percent, most of the change occur-
ring between 1897 and 1899_ From 1915 to 1920 the ratio went
from 18 percent to II percent, most of the change occurring he-
tween 1915 and 1918. From 1940 to 1944 the ratio declined from
9.4 percent to 5.8, the largest dccline taking place in 19H.
The decline in the ratio of capital to assets in the earlier periods
34was not reversed. Moreover, after the last war it was followed by
the most prolonged and devastating period of bank failures in the
history of this country. Objection to the low ratio now prevailin~
is largely based on the possibility that the present, or some still
lower, ratio may come to be regarded as adequate. The ratio is
thought of as a signpost whose function is to warn that there is
danger in continuing to reduce the share of ownership to total
assets. If the present relatively riskless assets should be replaced,
in the course of time, by an average cross-section of assets, so Iowa
ratio would not, it is alleged, provide sufficient protection.
The FDIC has made the suggestion that without a fairly high
proportion of capital to assets, commercial banks may be unable to
discharge their traditional function of financing private enterprise.
"Bankers must be in a position to bear successfully the reasonable
risks of such financing without imposing an undue burden of risk
upon the Government." 21 If they are unable to do so business and
agriculture will presumably be compelled to obtain credit else-
where, either from competing credit institutions or from govern-
mental agencies. In this case the preservation of a privately owned
and operated banking system, it is said, would be rendered increas-
ingly difficult.22
The lowering of the ratio of capital to assets has helped to offset
the effect on earnings of the decline in the rate of interest. If, for
example, the return per hundred dollars of earning assets should
drop to half what it was while the volume of earning assets
doubled, earnings, ceteris stantibus, would be the same as before.
The greater this pyramiding, the lower is the rate of yield on assets
that is required in order to provide a given return on capital. To
the extent that a greater pyramiding diminishes the incentive to
seek the most profitable uses of a bank's resources, its effect might
be to divert funds into relatively riskless investments and away from
venture capital.
Both bank reserves and capital accounts may be regarded as con-
tributing, in somewhat the same way, to the protection of deposi-
tors. Since reserves are not subject to depreciation in value, the
safety of deposits is presumably greater with a high ratio of reserves
to deposits. Under a system of 100 percent reserves, for example,
21 Federal Deposit In~urance Corporation. Annual Report, 1942, p. 5.
221bid.
35there would be no need, as fal' as the protection of depositors is
concerned, for any particular ratio of ('apital to assets. At the pres-
ent time banks hold a considerably higher reservc ratio than they
formerly did. O,-er the period from 19~!> to 1943 the increase ill
the ratio of member bank reserves corresponded closely to the
decrease in the ratio of capital aCCOuI1lS to hank assets. This inverse
movement of reserves constitutes anothel' factor offscltin~ any tcn-
dency for the decline in the ratio of capital to assets to wcaken the
protection afforded depositors.
23
A further consideration reducing the apparent si~nificanceof the
decline in capital ratios is the increasing resort hy commercial
23 Wilh a hi~her ratio of rt'Sen'es (and olher cash ilems) 10 101a1 assels a smaller
pf'n"llIa~e of IOtal assets is subjccl [0 dcpreli;lIion, The prolenion afforded 10
deposilors h\' a relali\'ely high n~sel'\'e ralio i, elJlI:t1 10 Ihal afforded h~' a relalh'CIJ
!li~h Glpilal ralio if the fan Ih;!! a snulln shale of ;lsselS may depreciale jnsl com-
pens,lles for Ihe fal I Ih:1I less (I[ " (II,hion exisls 10 ahwrL Ihe loss resnlting from Jny
deprecialion Ih:lI lIla\ occm. This lIIa~' be ilhlslraled hy a series of examples. We may
asmllle a hank h:I\'ing skelelonized balan((: sheel ilems as follows:
Resen'es 10 Capilal 10
Im'cslmclII 90 Deposils 90
Lei lIS Ihen ;ISSlIIne IW(l silnalions. one a donhlin~ of deposils accompanied by a
lOrresponding increase ill hOlh resen·es alld capilal. and Ihe olher a dOllbling of
deposils acwmpanied by no increase in capilal hUI wilh resenes rising from 10 10 40.
The fip;t posilion is represcllied ill Model A and Ihe second in Model B.
Model :\: Reserves 20 Capilal 20
Inveslment 180 Deposils 180
Model B: Resen'es 40 Capilal 10
Inveslment 150 Deposits 180
Wilh \':I!!'ing raleS of deprecialion in Ihe vallie of im'eslmenls. losses will he incurred
under condilions represenled by Models :\ and B. respeclively, as follows:
Percentage
Decline in TotalAmount Loss to Lonto
Depreciable 01 Lon Stockholders Depositors
Anels A B A B A B
]0.0% 18 ]5 is 10 0 5
20.0 36 !JO 20 10]6 20
!lU 60 50 20 10 40 40
40.0 72 60 20 10 52 50
50.0 90 75 20 10 70 65
II is seen Ihal. wilh a deprecialion of one-Ihird. the 1000s 10 deposilOrs under eilher set
of condilions would he Ihe same. \\'ilh a deprecialion of less Ihan Ihis amount
deposilors wonld lose more under condilions of a relali\'ely high resen'e ralio. and
wilh deprecialion in excess of one·lhird deposilors would lose more nnder conditiollS
of a relalivel~' high capilal ralio, TOlal los~. inclnding loss 10 bolh deposilors and
~lOckholders. wonld in all cases he less wilh a high ralio of resen-es 10 IOlal assels.
Dln'ionsh'. Ihe proleclion 10 deposilOrs wOllld he slill grealer if Ihe ralio of capilal
as well as Ihe ralio of Glsh were relali\'ely high, The models are snfficielll 10 C!'lablish
Ihe ronclnsion, howe\'cr, Ihal proleclion 10 deposilOrs is afforded h\' eilher melhod.
,,'ilh I~e. degr~ of,prOleclion allriblllahle 10 (each depending upo~ Ihe amonnt of
depreclall~nwhich IS ~ssnmed 10 occur. The poinl of equal prOlenion is governed by
Ihe magnlludes of capllal and resen'es relali\'e 10 IOlal asseIS.
36banks to what is known as "valuation allowances.":?~ Instead of set-
ting up separate reserve accounts, the values at which assets are
carried on the books of a bank arc currently written down by
char~es a~~inst earnin~s. Even assets of the highest quality may
be written down in this way, thou~h at a slower rate than lower-
grade assets. The policy of asset valuation has been encoura~edby
examiners. It avoids disadvantages which attach to building up
capital, surplus or reserve accounts, namely, the rigidity on the one
hand and the pressure to adopt a more liberal dividend policy on
the other. It also assures that provision for losses will be made in
good times as well as in had. The quantitative importance of val-
uation allowances at the present time is not known. It is apparent,
however, that because its effect is to create a cushion a~inst future
depreciation of assets, it helps to accomplish one of the purposes
formerly served by a relatively high ratio of capital to assets.
A relatively high ratio of capital to assets is sometimes defended
as a means of ~iving the owners a stake in the business sufficient to
assure careful administration.25 It presumes that the smaller the
owner's share, the greater is the temptation to take unwarranted
chances with the bank's funds. \Vhile this reasoning carries the
invidious implication that bankers might otherwise become care-
less with the funds entrusted to them, the maintenance of a rela-
tively high capital ratio accords with the prevailin~view that under
the private: enterprise system the proprietors' stake in business
should correspond with their responsibilities.26
INCIDENTAL FACTORS INFLUENCING
BANK LIQUIDITY
A number of minor factors bear upon the problem of bank liquid-
ity by influencing, for example, the degree of liquidity that now
exists or the ability of banks to meet possible demands for cash out
24 Also refcrred 10 as "unalhx:aled cha~e-oITs:' "valualion reserves," "deprecialion
and amorlilation allowances," "reserve accounlin~."
25 In few businesses is Ihc ralio of o\\"llcrs' equil\' 10 lolal assels as low as il is in
·hankinR. Requiring a high ralio of capilal 10 assels in order to assure caulion is
somewhal similar to Ihe praclice of imposing margin requiremenls in conneclion wilh
purchases on the slock market.
26 The same obsen'alion has been advanced in En~lilnd where a considerably lower
ralio of capilal 10 assels prevails. In Ihe firsl IWO ~'ears of Ihe war Ihe ralio for a
~roup of leading joinl-sloc\;' banks fell from 5.6 percent 10 4 percenl. AI Ihe end of
1944 it was appl'Oximalel~' 3.2 percenl.
37of their uwn resources. As is indicated later, a by-product of the
war loan drives has been tc:rnporarily to increase bank liquidity.
This occurs apart from, and frequently in the complete absence of.
any expansion in cash or reduction in total deposits. It is a con·
sequence of the technicality that legal reserves are not required
against war loan accounts of the United States Treasury. The pur·
chase of Treasury obligations by individuals and businesses involves
the transfer of large amounts of deposits from the public to the
government, with the result that the reserves previously required
against these deposits become classified as excess reserves. The effect
is to increase the liquidity of the bank for the time bein~, since
excess resen'es render a bank more liquid than an equal amount of
required reserves. \Vith the disbursement of funds by the Treasury
and the transfer of deposits back to private holdings, the excess of
reserves created in this way is ~adually reduced.
The addition thus made to excess reserves is largely a function of
the growth in size of Treasury balances with banks. The liquidity
that arises in this manner can be seen to be transitory. Excess
reserves of such temporary character afford relatively little induce-
ment to credit expansion. although they may lead banks to increase
their holdings of short-term assets such as Treasury bills.
The liquidity of particular hanks may also be affected by taxa-
tion. especially with the hi;;;il rates now in force. Certain of the
larger banks of the countr:' are today subject to excess profits taxa·
tion at or near the 1l1aximLm level of rates. Out of the additional
net return such banks mirht derive by purchasing securities of
longer a,-erage maturity. th( gO\-emment would take up to 95 per-
cent. Although the bank may see no need for being as liquid as
it now is. it ma~ nevertheless feel that the net addition to profits
after taxes wr,uld not be sufficient to justify holding less liquid
assets. Inr.~ed, if it were not for the patriotic incenti,-e to lend as
fulh' ,.s possible to the gO\-ernment, the bank might prefer to hold
c.ash rather than acquire an)- son of a,-ailable earning assets except.
possibly. tax-exempt securities. E,-en before the passage of excess
profits taxation the low net return obtainable on many types of
assets discouraged banks from lending and investing and was partly
responsible for the high level of excess resen-es prevailin'7 durina o 0
the I930·s.
The earnings outlook may be inRuential in determininCF whether
~
38a bank assumes a less liquid position~for example, by reducing its
idle cash orshifting to higheryield securities. Aside from the effect
on the volume of a bank's liquid assets, earnings may also affect the
extent of the demand for liquidity. A satisfactory earnings record
is an indication of a bank's success and by inspiring confidence in
the strength of the bank it may lessen the danger of a serious
increase in cash withdrawals. In addition, earnings in excess of
dividendsmay aid in buildingup capital and in establishing resen;es
for contingencies, even though they are of little importance in
m,eeting an emergency.
During the early years of wartime expansion the earnings of
I~rge, and particularly of metropolitan, banks increased more rap-
idly than those of outlying banks. For a time, in fact. the income
of many of the smaller country banks showed a declining tt:mlt:llcy.
Banks in all size groups experienced a growth of deposits and of
earning assets in the form of government obligations yielding a low
rate of return. By and large, the expansion of income from these
assets more than offset the decline in yield from other assets of the
city banks, but for many country banks it failed to do so. An impor-
tant reason for this d'ifference was that in the past the yield on
assets of country banks usually averaged considerably above that of
city banks. In general, therefore, the disparity between accustomed
yield and the yield currentlyobtainable was greater for country than
for city banks. Consequently the profits of banks in the interior
were not aided by the growth in total assets to the same extent as
those of banks in the larger centers.
'Vith the continued expansion in deposits smaller banks also
experienced a'substantial increase in earnings and the number of
banks failing to share in the general prosperity diminished. Not
only have net earnings continued to improve but, except where
local conditions such as the liquidation of war industries or a
decline in farm income may be expected to result in a shrinkage
of deposits, the prospect for generous earnings in the future remains
excellent.
39